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I. INTRODUCTIONO N OCTOBER 11, 2010, the White House Press Secretary
released a one-paragraph statement announcing that Presi-
dent Barack Obama signed S. 3729, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration Act of 2010 (2010 Act).' A central
provision of the 2010 Act was the cancellation of NASA's Con-
stellation Program. 2 This cancellation represented a victory for
the Obama administration after an almost year-long attempt to
cancel Constellation that began on February 1, 2010, with the
rollout of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request to Con-
gress. The short statement was a contrast to the rollout, which
included press releases, fact sheets, and media events with NASA
Administrator Charles Bolden and the President's Science Advi-
sor, John P. Holdren.4 President Obama even flew to NASA's
Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on S. 3729
(Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/
10/11/statement-press-secretary-s-3729.
2 See Tariq Malik, NASA Grieves over Canceled Program, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 2,
2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35209628/ns/technology-andscience-
space/t/nasa-grieves-over-canceled-program/.
3 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAR 2011 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Press Release, NASA, NASA Announces Two News Conferences to
Discuss the 2011 Budget and a Bold New Approach to Exploration (Jan. 31,
2010), available at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/20l0/jan/HQ.M10-
018_NASA_201 1-Budget.html; Fact Sheet: A Bold New Approach for Space Exploration
and Discovery, OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE AD-
MIN., http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp-
space-conf-factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet, OFFICE
OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY].
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Kennedy Space Center in Florida to show his commitment to
the space agency after several members of Congress and a num-
ber of former astronauts, including Neil Armstrong and Jim
Lovell, criticized the proposal.5
Initially, it may appear that a one-paragraph statement by the
press secretary is not sufficient to commemorate the signing of
legislation that endorsed the administration's central proposal
for NASA. But, the small statement makes more sense when
considering that, although the 2010 Act permitted the adminis-
tration to cancel the Constellation Program, it also directs NASA
to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle with a goal of becoming
operational no later than December 21, 2016.6 This require-
ment is directly contrary to the administration's proposal of be-
ginning only a new heavy-lift research and development
program, and not a new vehicle.7 Additionally, the 2010 Act
specifies minimum performance requirements for the vehicle
and strongly suggests that NASA use specific technologies in de-
veloping the new vehicle.' The 2010 Act represents the first
time Congress acted as a legislative rocket scientist and went be-
yond merely providing political direction by setting broad goals
and aspirations for NASA.
Since the beginning of the Space Age, political leaders pro-
vided NASA with direction in the form of broad goals and aspi-
rations and gave the agency unique statutory authority to
provide flexibility in achieving those goals.9 The National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1958, popularly known as the Space
Act, contains several unique provisions that give NASA signifi-
cant flexibility in achieving its mission." On May 25, 1961, in a
speech to ajoint session of Congress, PresidentJohn F. Kennedy
challenged the country to land a man on the moon before the
5 Marc Kaufman & Scott Wilson, Obama Says He's '100 Percent Committed' to
NASA's Mission, Mars Exploration, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 7843005.
6 See National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
2010 (2010 NASA Authorization Act), Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 302, 124 Stat. 2805,
2814-15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18322).
7 See Charles Bolden, Adm'r, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Statement at
the NASA Budget Press Conference (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://
www.nasa.gov/pdf/420994main_201 lBudgetAdministratorRemarks.pdf.
8 See 2010 NASA Authorization Act § 302(b).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part II.A.
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end of the decade. I" With the timing and destination set, NASA
embarked on a mission to meet President Kennedy's challenge
through the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Programs.1" Despite
setbacks, including the loss of Apollo 1 in early 1967, NASA
achieved President Kennedy's goal when the Apollo 11 crew
landed on the lunar surface in July 1969.3
This broad political direction continued with the space shut-
tle's development during President Richard Nixon's administra-
tion and with what is now the International Space Station (ISS),
developed throughout the administrations of Presidents Ronald
Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and William J. "Bill" Clinton.1 4
The broad-direction theme continued in the Constellation Pro-
gram's development where President George W. Bush outlined
the timing and destinations of a return to the moon and a fu-
ture journey to Mars, and Congress endorsed those goals in the
2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts.1 5
The broad direction and flexibility that NASA enjoyed ended
with the 2010 Act. 16 In May 2009, the Obama administration
appointed Norman Augustine, former Lockheed Martin Chief
Executive Officer, to lead a committee to conduct a review of
planned human spaceflight activities. 7 The committee's final
I John F. Kennedy, President, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent Na-
tional Needs, (May 25, 1961), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=8151.
12 See StephenJ. Dick, 50 Years of NASA History, in NASA: 50 YEARS OF EXPLORA-
TION AND DIScOvWRY 32 (Rhonda Carpenter & Ana Lopez eds., 2008), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50thmagazine/50years.html (click "50 Years of
NASA History" hyperlink).
13 Id.
14 SeeJohn M. Logsdon, Ten Presidents and NASA, in NASA: 50 YEARS OF EXPLO-
RATION AND DIscOvERY 226, 231-37 (Rhonda Carpenter & Ana Lopez eds., 2008),
available at http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th-magazine/10presidents.html.
15 NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION
(2004), available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main vision space-explora-
tion2.pdf; see National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 2008 (2008
NASA Authorization Act), Pub. L. No. 110-422, §§ 401, 402, 122 Stat. 4779,
4788-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17731), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-
314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010); National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration Act of 2005 (2005 NASA Authorization Act), Pub. L. No. 109-155,
§§ 501-07, 119 Stat. 2895, 2927-28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010).
16 See 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, 124 Stat. 2805 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
17 Press Release, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, U.S. Announces Review of
Human Space Flight Plans (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/files/documents/ostp/press_release-files/NASA%20Review.pdf.
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report essentially found that Constellation had been un-
derfunded since its inception, was behind schedule, and that
human spaceflight beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under
the 2010 funding guidelines.18 After the report's release, Con-
gress passed NASA's 2010 appropriations bill, which included
language that prevented NASA from cancelling Constellation-
related programs without congressional approval. 9 After Presi-
dent Obama proposed cancelling Constellation, NASA advised
the Constellation contractors that they were responsible for ter-
mination costs under the terms of their contracts. 20 As a conse-
quence, one contractor decided to reserve funds to cover
potential contract termination costs and asked for additional
funding to continue work through the year. 21 This request led
to a rebalancing of funding priorities in the Constellation port-
folio. 22 After months of hearings and negotiations, the House of
Representatives passed the 2010 Act the night before adjourn-
ing for the November elections.28 President Obama signed the
2010 Act on October 11, 2010.24
After examining the policies and legislation guiding NASA's
activities since the agency's inception in 1958 and the events
leading to the 2010 Act, this Comment concludes that the 2010
Act represents the most prudent course of action to ensure that
the United States is not left without independent access to space
while acknowledging the President's prerogative to move the
space program in a direction consistent with presidential priori-
ties. Beginning with the Space Act and ending with the 2008
NASA Authorization Act, Part II provides background informa-
tion on the policies and legislation that guided the U.S. human
spaceflight program since its inception.
Part III analyzes the events leading to the 2010 Act's passage
beginning with President Obama creating the Augustine Com-
mittee and culminating with him signing the 2010 Act.
18 REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMM., SEEKING A HUMAN SPACEF-
LIGHT PROGRAM WORTHY OF A GREAT NATION 11-12 (2009).
19 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit. Il,
123 Stat. 3034, 3143 (2009).
20 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Robinson, CFO, Nat'l Aeronautics &
Space Admin. (Dec. 28, 2010) (on file with author).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Wraps up Session Early as Midterm Races Loom,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/us/politics/
30cong.html.
24 See Press Release, White House, supra note 1.
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Through interviews with various officials involved in drafting the
legislation in Congress and former and current NASA officials,
including a former NASA Administrator, Part IV examines the
meaning of several ambiguous provisions in the 2010 Act from
several perspectives and highlights issues that may arise from im-
plementing the 2010 Act.
Part IV also examines Congress's decision to cancel the Con-
stellation Program and to give NASA specific direction in mini-
mum capability requirements and in the technologies to use in
designing the new rockets. This part also examines whether the
United States will retain its leadership role in human
spaceflight.
Finally, Part V concludes that while the 2010 Act breaks the
tradition of merely providing goals and aspirations for the
human spaceflight program in the United States, in light of the
lessons learned in the Challenger and Columbia accidents and the
significant technical and financial investments made in space
shuttle and Constellation-related technologies, the 2010 Act rep-
resents the most prudent course of action to preserve America's
preeminence in space.
II. UNITED STATES SPACE POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE
BACKGROUND
The United States' activities in space have often been impor-
tant to political leaders in both the legislative and executive
branches of government; however, space activities have never
had as much interest as they did at the beginning of the Space
Race after the Soviet Union stunned the United States with Sput-
nik's launch on October 4, 1957.25 The importance that the
United States placed on space activities manifested in several
unique provisions included in NASA's founding legislation, the
Space Act. 26 This part provides readers with an overview of the
context surrounding NASA's creation and explains why the
Space Act contains these unique provisions.
A. THE BEGINNING: SPUTNIK AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
NASA was born almost a year after the Soviet Union launched
Sputnik.2 7 According to NASA's chief historian, "NASA's birth
was directly related to the launch of the Sputniks and the ensu-
25 See Dick, supra note 12.
26 See infra Part II.A.
27 See Dick, supra note 12.
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"128ing race to demonstrate technological superiority in space.
The United States initially responded to Sputnik by launching
Explorer I in January of 1958 and then by institutionalizing space
activities with NASA's creation.29 President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower signed the Space Act on July 29, 1958, and NASA began
operations on October 1, 1958.30
Shortly after the Soviets launched Sputnik, then-Senator Lyn-
don B. Johnson contacted Eileen Galloway at the Legislative Ref-
erence Service to help with hearings addressing America's
response. 1 The hearings began on November 25, 1957, with
the general assumption that the United States faced a military
problem.12 But this assumption was rebutted by scientists and
engineers who "discussed the important practical applications of
space that NASA could facilitate, including long-term meteoro-
logical forecasts and rapid long-range radio communications."33
Testimony at the hearings also predicted human spaceflight, in-
cluding human moon landings. 4
1. The First Steps: NASA Begins to Take Shape
While the legislative branch was investigating how to respond
to Sputnik, various executive branch agencies were maneuvering
to run America's space program.3 5 The National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) was a logical choice to run the
space program because twenty-five percent of the agency's work
related to space research.36 In addition to NACA, several other




31 Eilene Galloway, Sputnik and the Creation of NASA: A Personal Perspective, in
NASA: 50 YEARs OF EXPLORATION AND DISCOVERY 48 (Rhonda Carpenter & Ana
Lopez eds., 2008), available at http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th-magazine/
50years.html (click "Sputnik and the Creation of NASA: A Personal Perspective"
hyperlink). In addition to her contributions to the Space Act, Galloway, often
called "the grand matriarch of space law," also worked to create the United Na-




35 See Edward S. Goldstein et al., Present at the Creation: Paul G. Dembling, Author
of NASA's Founding Legislation, in NASA: 50 YEARs OF EXPLORATION AND DISGOVERY
50 (Rhonda Carpenter & Aia Lopez eds., 2008), available at http://
www.nasa.gov/5Oth/5Othmagazine/5Oyears.html (click "Present at the Creation:
Paul G. Dembling, Author of NASA's Founding Legislation" hyperlink).
36 Id.
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States' space efforts.37 For example, the U.S. Army strongly felt
that it should run any space program because of Warner von
Braun and his efforts related to the launch of Explorer I at the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal near Hunts-
ville, Alabama.3" The Atomic Energy Commission and the Air
Force also lobbied for the space program.39
Paul G. Dembling, NACA's General Counsel, asked Director
Hugh Dryden for some time away from his duties to "go off in a
corner and draft a piece of legislation that we would be satisfied
with if we got the choice of being the agency to handle the space
program."4 ° Director Dryden agreed, and Dembling began by
reviewing General Accounting Office (GAO) opinions for
sources of authority for agency actions because Congress heavily
relied on the comptroller general in interpreting appropriation
and authorization laws.41 In addition to consulting the GAO
opinions, Dembling accompanied NACA's Executive Secretary
John F. Victory to the Pentagon and to other agencies needed to
get the new agency approved.42 At these meetings, Victory
would place the draft legislation in front of the individual he was
meeting with and would allow those individuals to make
changes.4" After an individual made changes, Victory then re-
ferred to that draft as the draft of the individual who had most
recently edited the document." Dembling believed these ef-
forts provided NASA "more authority than any other depart-
ment or agency. 4 5
In April 1958, President Eisenhower sent House Majority
Leader John McCormack draft legislation creating the National
Aeronautics and Space Agency.46 Leader McCormack contacted
Eilene Galloway for her thoughts on the bill.47 Because several
agencies would likely have space activities, Galloway argued that
she "did not like the institution to be called an agency with a





41 Id. at 50-52. The General Accounting Office is now known as the Govern-
ment Accountability Office.




46 Galloway, supra note 31.
47 Id.
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quired the coordination and cooperation of a number of agen-
cies in the federal government, and NASA needed enough
stature to work effectively with them to coordinate space
projects."4 McCormack replied that they were already calling
the agency NASA, and Galloway responded that the agency
could be referred to as an administration with an administrator
to coordinate all of the space-related activities already engaged
in by other government agencies.49 McCormack agreed and or-
dered the legislation changed to reflect the institution's new
name, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.50
2. Unique Space Act Provisions
Congress cited the U.S. Constitution's General Welfare clause
as the authority for creating NASA.5 The Space Act establishes
that a civilian agency shall have responsibility and "control over
aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United
States. '52 But, the Defense Department retains authority over
space-related "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with
the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States. '53 Dembling claimed that the De-
fense Department would not have supported NASA's creation
without that provision.54
In reviewing the GAO rulings, Dembling tried to include each
type of transaction covered in those rulings, but someone asked
about other kinds of transactions that were not contracts, leases,
or cooperative agreements. 55 Dembling could not think of any
other term to use, so he settled on "[o] ther transactions as may
be determined or necessary in the conduct of its work."56 The
language, which survives in section 203(b) (5), "gives NASA a
great deal of flexibility since the language places the decision




51 See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space Act), Pub. L. No. 85-
568, § 102(b), 72 Stat. 426, 426 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2451), re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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because "it is not subject to any regular procurement or any
other rules or regulations.""
The Space Act also permits NASA to engage in a program of
international cooperation.5" section 205 provides that NASA,
"under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may en-
gage in a program of international cooperation. '5 9 The lan-
guage referring to the President's foreign policy guidance was
included to appease the State Department's concerns. 60 Addi-
tionally, section 205 includes language indicating that "the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate" may be necessary in approving
NASA's international agreements; 61 however, President Eisen-
hower included a signing statement that he interpreted the sec-
tion as merely recognizing the authority to enter into space-
related international treaties but not as precluding less formal
arrangements for cooperation.62 Galloway later wrote a Senate
document for Senator Johnson listing the different ways that
NASA could cooperate with other nations, including memo-
randa of understanding, executive agreements, and letters.63
B. APOLLO AND THE RACE TO THE MOON
After President Kennedy challenged the country to go to the
moon, Congress quickly responded.64 On July 21, 1961, Presi-
dent Kennedy signed the bill authorizing NASA to proceed with
the moon proposal.65 The bill largely granted NASA broad au-
thority to carry out the moon mission and did not give any spe-
cific direction on how to spend the funds, but it did place
limited restrictions on a few items, including limitations on new
construction.66  The legislation passed so overwhelmingly
through Congress that the Senate did not take a recorded vote
57 Space Act, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 203(b), 72 Stat. 426, 426 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2472), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444
(Dec. 18, 2010); Goldstein, supra note 35, at 52.
58 See Space Act § 205.
59 Id.
60 Goldstein, supra note 35, at 52.
61 Space Act § 205.
62 Galloway, supra note 31, at 49.
63 Conversations with Eilene Galloway, AEROSPACE AM.,Jan. 2008, at 14, available at
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace-old/images/articleimages/pdf/CONVERSA-
TIONSJan2008.pdf.
64 SPACEFLIGHT AND THE MYTH OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 3 (Roger D.
Launius & Howard E. McCurdy eds., 1997).
65 Id.; see also Act ofJuly 21, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-98, 75 Stat. 216, 216 (authoriz-
ing appropriations to begin moon program).
66 Act of July 21, 1961, 75 Stat. at 216.
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on the matter, and the House of Representatives passed the leg-
islation by a 354-59 margin.6" After NASA achieved President
Kennedy's goal with Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin
landing on the moon and executing a successful return, NASA
landed five additional crews on the lunar surface, ending with
Apollo 17 in December of 1972.68 Twelve men ultimately walked
on the moon, and the Apollo Program ended, after coming full-
circle, with the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975.69
C. THE SPACE SHUTTLE
The next major shift in political direction for the space pro-
gram on came January 5, 1972, with President Richard Nixon's
announcement of the space shuttle and its goal of providing
cheaper and routine access to space.70 Congress approved fund-
ing for the space shuttle later that year. 71 The Space Transpor-
tation System, commonly known as the space shuttle, became
operational in April 1981 with Columbia's maiden voyage.72
On January 25, 1984, President Ronald Reagan directed
NASA to build an international space station within a decade.73
Congress responded by authorizing $150 million for space sta-
tion development.74 Congress also directed the President to es-
tablish a National Commission on Space with the purpose of
identifying "long range goals, opportunities, and policy options
for United States civilian space activity for the next twenty
67 SPACEFLIGHT AND THE MYFH OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 64.
68 Dick, supra note 12, at 33.
69 Id.
70 President Nixon 's 1972 Announcement on the Space Shuttle, NAT'L AERONAUTICS
& SPACE ADMIN., http://history.nasa.gov/stsnixon.htm (last visitedJan. 23, 2011).
71 See Department of Housing and Urban Development: Space, Science, Veter-
ans, and Certain Other Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 92-383, 86 Stat. 540, 544 (Aug. 14, 1972); National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. 92-304, 86 Stat. 157, 157-58
(May 19, 1972); see also NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., ASTRONAUTICS AND
AERONAUTICS, 1972, 193 (1974) (stating that the appropriations act did not direct
how much of the research and development funds NASA should spend on the
space shuttle, but did reject amendments to prevent NASA from spending funds
on space shuttle development).
72 Dick, supra note 12, at 33.
73 President Reagan's Statement on the International Space Station, NAT'L AERONAU-
TICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://history.nasa.gov/reagan84.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2011).
74 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 98-361, § 101 (a) (2), 98 Stat. 422, 422 (July 16, 1984).
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years," while considering "the commitment by the Nation to a
permanently manned space station in low Earth orbit. 7 5
The space program suffered one of its darkest days on January
28, 1986, as space shuttle Challenger was destroyed shortly after
launch, killing all seven crew members. 6 The commission that
investigated the accident found that the primary cause was a
faulty solid-rocket motor; however, the commission also impli-
cated the pressure on the Space Shuttle Program to maintain a
high flight rate that began with the shuttle's inception and con-
tinued with President Reagan's 1982 decision that designated
the shuttle as "the primary space launch system for both na-
tional security and civil government missions. '77 Congress re-
sponded to the accident by declaring the shuttle to be a "critical
national resource that should be preserved" and authorizing
NASA to procure another orbiter.78 Congress also declared that
the nation should utilize the shuttle primarily for missions that
required its unique capabilities and that NASA should develop a
family of expendable launch vehicles for payloads that did not
require the shuttle's capabilities. 79 The 1988 Authorization Act
also formally directed the NASA Administrator to undertake the
construction of a space station to be operational by 1995.80
Twenty years after the Apollo 1I moon landing, President
George H. W. Bush proposed a new series of goals for NASA
beginning with completing Space Station Freedom, returning to
the moon, and ultimately embarking on a manned mission to
Mars. 81 Although NASA ultimately proceeded with the develop-
ment of the space station, the moon and Mars initiatives were
dead by the end of President George H. W. Bush's term.82 Presi-
dent Clinton oversaw the transition of Space Station Freedom to
75 Id. § 204.
76 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT 19 (June 6, 1986), available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/
genindex.htm.
77 See id. at 164.
78 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-147, § 116, 101 Stat. 860, 866-67 (Oct. 30, 1987).
79 Id. § 116(a), (b).
80 Id. § 106(a).
81 President George H. W. Bush Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the
Apollo 11 Moon Landing (June 20, 1989), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.
edu/research/public-papers.php?id=712&year=1989&month=all.
82 Logsdon, supra note 14, at 236.
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the present-day ISS through the additions of Russia, Europe, Ja-
pan, and Canada as partners.8 3
Since the Challenger accident, there has been an almost con-
tinuous effort to replace the shuttle with a safer and more capa-
ble vehicle. 4 But, each proposed vehicle was cancelled for
technical, budgetary, or political reasons.85 Today, the space
shuttle remains the only U.S. vehicle that provides human access
to space.
D. THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT AND THE VISION FOR
SPACE EXPLORATION
On February 1, 2003, space shuttle Columbia broke apart dur-
ing reentry, killing the seven astronauts onboard.86 The subse-
quent investigation into the accident's causes conducted by the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) found that the
lack of a national mandate for the human spaceflight program
since the Apollo Program resulted in NASA finding "it necessary
to gain the support of diverse constituencies. This necessity
led NASA "to participate in the give and take of the normal po-
litical process" and often meant that the agency would not re-
ceive funding consistent with its programmatic ambitions. 8
The CAIB also found that NASA's previous attempts to develop
a vehicle to replace the space shuttle represented a "failure of
national leadership" and that future attempts to provide a re-
placement would only be successful if there were sustained sup-
port and a clear idea of how the new vehicle would fit into the
nation's overall plans for space.8 9
In light of the report's findings, President George W. Bush
outlined the Vision for Space Exploration (Vision) on January
14, 2004, in a speech at NASA Headquarters.9 ° The Vision di-
rected NASA to complete the ISS and retire the space shuttle by
2010, to develop a Crew Exploration Vehicle to provide human
83 Id. at 237.
84 SeeJohn M. Logsdon, "A Failure of National Leadership": Why No Replacement for
the Space Shuttle?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 269-300
(Steven J. Dick & Roger D. Launius eds., 2006).
85 See id.
86 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT VOLUME I, 6 (2003).
87 Id. at 209.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 211.
90 See Press Release, White House, President Bush Announces New Vision for
Space Exploration Program (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html.
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access to space no later than 2014, and to return to the moon by
2020 as the first step for missions farther out in the solar sys-
tem.9" President George W. Bush also appointed a commission
led by former Air Force Secretary Edwin C. Pete Aldridge,Jr. "to
advise on implementing the vision. 9 2
On April 14, 2005, Michael D. Griffin began his tenure as the
eleventh NASA Administrator.93 Immediately thereafter, on
April 29, 2005, Griffin initiated a review of the agency's Vision-
related initiatives.14 The review resulted in the Exploration Sys-
tems Architecture Study.95 The study called for the develop-
ment of a lunar architecture consisting of: (1) a capsule-shaped
Crew Exploration Vehicle to service the ISS and provide crew
transport to the moon and other destinations; (2) a crew launch
vehicle to place the Crew Exploration Vehicle into low-Earth or-
bit; and (3) an unmanned heavy-lift launch vehicle to launch an
Earth-departure stage and a lunar lander.96 The resulting vehi-
cles were collectively known as the Constellation Program, and
NASA chose the names Orion for the Crew Exploration Vehicle,
Ares I for the crew launch vehicle, and Ares V for the heavy-lift
launch vehicle.97 Congress broadly endorsed the plan in the
2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts. 9 8
III. SAUSAGE MAKING AT ITS FINEST: THE 2010 ACT
BECOMES THE LAW OF THE LAND
"Laws are like sausages-it is best not to see them being made. ,g
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Press Release, NASA, Michael Griffin Takes the Helm as NASA Administra-
tor (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2005/apr/
HQ05096_griffinhelm.html.
94 See NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA's EXPLORATION SYSTEMS AR-
CHITECTURE STUDY 1-2 (2005).
95 Id. at 1.
96 Id.
97 Press Release, NASA, NASA Names New Crew Vehicle Orion (Aug. 22,
2006), available at http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/home/orion-announce-
ment.html.
98 See2008 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-422, §§ 401, 402, 122 Stat.
4779, 4788-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17731), repealed by Pub. L. No.
111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010); 2005 NASA Authorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 109-155, § 501, 119 Stat. 2895, 2927-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 16761), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010).
99 The quote is often attributed to Otto von Bismarck, but the earliest docu-
mented source is attributed to lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe and reads "Laws,
like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are
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That oft-quoted maxim is certainly applicable to the process
that culminated with the enactment of the 2010 Act, a process
that continues today as NASA begins to implement the 2010 Act.
The sequence of events leading to the 2010 Act began in May
2009 with the appointment of the Augustine Committee to re-
view NASA's current human spaceflight plans.100 After the Com-
mittee released the report in October 2009, the administration
released the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 on
February 1, 2010, and proposed cancelling the Constellation
Program and redirecting that funding to technology develop-
ment and to jumpstarting the development of new commercial
providers. 01 Several members of Congress strongly reacted to
the proposal, and NASA's congressional oversight committees
held several hearings with prominent individuals within the
space community in the spring. 1
0 2
The House of Representatives and Senate eventually drafted
two bills, but because of Congress's pending midterm-election
adjournment, both houses passed the Senate version of the bill
because there was not time for a conference committee to re-
solve the differences between the two bills.10 3 President Obama
signed the 2010 Act on October 11, 2010.104 NASA is beginning
to carry out the 2010 Act's direction, but it seems likely that the
tension between Congress and the Obama administration will
continue after seeing congressional reaction to a NASA report
released in January 2011 and to President Obama's fiscal year
2012 budget request. 10 5
made" in the March 29, 1869, edition of the Cleveland Herald. Fred R. Shapiro,
Quote... Misquote, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html.
100 See infra Part III.A.
10 See id.
102 See id.
103 Interview with Ken Monroe, Prof'l Staff Member, Comm. on Sci. and Tech.,
U.S. House of Representatives, in D.C. (Dec. 14, 2010).
104 Press Release, White House, supra note 1.
105 See Press Release, Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., U.S. Senate, Sen-
ate Commerce Committee Members Respond to NASA Report (Jan. 12, 2011),
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&
ContentRecordid=67657ee7-1953-4b62-a78c-aeld4a9ela29; Mark K. Matthews,
Budget Proposal for NASA Reopens Fight with Congress, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 15,
2011, at A7, available at 2011 WLNR 2977523.
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A. CHANGE OF DIRECTION: THE AUGUSTINE COMMITTEE AND
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST
TO CONGRESS
On May 7, 2009, the Obama administration "announced the
launch of an independent review of planned U.S. human space
flight activities" to be led by Norman Augustine, former Chief
Executive Officer of Lockheed Martin.10 6 President Obama
challenged the panel to examine NASA's current and planned
development activities and to "present options for advancing a
safe, innovative, affordable, and sustainable human space flight
program in the years following Space Shuttle retirement."1'07
The panel released its final report on October 22, 2009.108
The panel concluded that "the U.S. human spaceflight pro-
gram appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory" and that the
program was "perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing
goals that do not match allocated resources." 0 9 The panel
found that Constellation "faced a mismatch between funding
and program content" since its inception and that "the pro-
gram's long-term budget has been steadily reduced below the
level expected by NASA."" 0
Perhaps sensing that Constellation was in danger, Congress
inserted a proviso in the 2010 Appropriations Act preventing
NASA from using any funds "for the termination or elimination
of any program, project or activity of the architecture for the
Constellation program.""' The 2010 Appropriations Act also
prevents NASA from using any funds for the creation or initia-
tion of "a new program, project or activity" unless allowed in
subsequent acts.1 12
On February 1, 2010, the Obama administration presented its
fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress and did in fact pro-
pose canceling Constellation and redirecting the funding to
new technologies and commercial providers. 113 The request
106 Press Release, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, supra note 17.
107 Id.
108 Press Release, NASA, Human Space Flight Review Committee Report Avail-
able Thursday (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/
2009/oct/HQM09-202_Space-flight report.txt.
10 REVIEW OF U.S. HuMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMM., SEEKING A HuMAN
SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM WORTHY OF A GREAT NATION 9 (2009).
11o Id. at 58.
111 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit.
II1, 123 Stat. 3034, 3143 (2009).
112 Id.
113 Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF ScI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 4.
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also proposed extending the ISS until 2020, funding research
and development on new engines for future heavy-lift vehicles,
and investing in new technologies that NASA could potentially
use for future human space exploration.' 14 One of the propo-
sal's central elements was a shift from government-owned-and-
operated vehicles to commercially-owned-and-operated vehicles
for human access to low-Earth orbit and the ISS. 115
Members of NASA's oversight committee in the House of
Representatives met Constellation's proposed cancellation with
skepticism.' 16  House Science Committee Chairman Bart
Gordon described it as "a radical change from the approach to
human spaceflight," while Representative Gabrielle Giffords
said, "[w] hat is most striking about the budget is the lack of an
overall vision."' 1 7 The proposal received a similar reception in
the Senate. "We need a plan that provides America with unin-
terrupted access to space while also funding exploration to ex-
pand the boundaries of our knowledge," stated Senator Bill
Nelson, who flew on the space shuttle in the late 1980s. 11' Sena-
tor David Vitter, ranking member of the Senate Commerce Sub-
committee on Science and Space stated, "'I believe that if we
follow this proposed radical new plan, America will lose forever
our leadership role in human space flight and all of the techno-
logical advances that go with it.'""
In response to the criticism, President Obama delivered a
speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010.12° Presi-
dent Obama proposed keeping a smaller version of Orion and
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Sci. & Tech., U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Committee Expresses Caution over Proposed Changes to NASA's Human
Space Flight Program (Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Chairman Expresses Caution],
available at http://sciencedems.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=2752;
Press Release, Comm. on Sci. & Tech., U.S. House of Representatives, Republi-
cans Question Obama's Science Adviser on R&D Budget Priorities (Feb. 24,
2010), available at http://science.house.gov/PressRoom/Item.aspx?ID=225.
117 Chairman Expresses Caution, supra note 116.
118 Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, Text of Sen. Nelson's Re-
sponse to Initial Reports on the Administration's NASA Budget (Jan. 28, 2010),
available at http://billnelson.senate.gov/news/details.cfm?id=321928&.
119 Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. David Vitter, Vitter Expresses Disappoint-
ment in President's NASA Cuts in Budget (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://vit-
ter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases (select
"February 2010" in "Browse by," click "Go," then click "Vitter Expresses Disap-
pointment in President's NASA Cuts in Budget" hyperlink).
120 Kaufman & Wilson, supra note 5.
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said that NASA should plan to send astronauts to asteroids by
2025 and to Mars a decade later.12' The President also pointed
out that he was increasing NASA's budget while freezing almost
all other discretionary spending.122 The new plans did not si-
lence all the critics, including Senator Richard Shelby, who
called the original budget request "'a complete disaster'" and
described the new plan as "'a continued abdication of America's
leadership in space.'"123
B. CONGRESS RESPONDS: HEARINGS, RESTRICTIONS, AND THE
2010 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT
After the President released the budget request, Congress
conducted eight hearings throughout the winter and spring re-
garding the budget request and the proposed changes to
NASA's human spaceflight program. 124 The hearings evaluated
the proposed changes, including the commercial space sector's
capabilities. 125 Journalists, the President's Science Advisor, the
NASA Administrator, commercial executives, and former astro-
nauts, including the first man to walk on the moon, Neil A. Arm-
strong, and the last man to walk on the moon, Apollo 17
commander Eugene A. Cernan, testified in the hearings.
126
In July 2010, Congress further restricted NASA's ability to end
Constellation. In the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Congress added a second proviso stating that the funds pro-
vided in the 2010 Act "shall be available to fund continued per-
formance of Constellation contracts, and performance of such
Constellation contracts may not be terminated for convenience
by [NASA] in fiscal year 2010. "1127
1. The House of Representatives Attempts to Salvage Constellation
On July 20, 2010, House Science Committee Chairman Bart




124 See Congressional Hearing Calendar, 111th Congress, Second Session, NAT'L AERO-
NAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://www.hq.nasa.gov/legislative/hearings/2010%20
hearings/index%202010.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat.
2302, 2304-05 (2010).
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Olson, and Gabrielle Giffords, introduced H.R. 5781.128 The
legislation began with several findings that conflicted with the
budget proposal's reliance on commercial providers for human
access to space. 129 One finding quoted the Augustine Commit-
tee and concluded that "' [w] hile there are many potential bene-
fits"' to using commercial providers, "'there are simply too
many risks at the present time not to have a viable fallback op-
tion.' '' 130 The next finding stated that "[i]t is in the national
interest for the United States Government to develop a govern-
ment system to serve as an independent means" for access to
space and not to depend on either foreign or commercial sys-
tems for human access to space. 1' Further it pointed out that
within the current environment of "constrained budgets," it is
imperative that changes to the exploration program are carried
out in a manner that builds on the investments made in the
Constellation Program, and it emphasized a priority develop-
ment of crewed and heavy-lift transportation to minimize the
gap between the shuttle's retirement and a follow-on system
coming online.1 2
Section 201 reaffirmed the exploration policies outlined in
the 2008 Authorization Act, which suggested that the President
invite international partners to participate in the program and
reaffirmed the 2005 Act's policy of exploring the moon, Mars,
and other destinations. 1 33 Section 202 required the NASA Ad-
ministrator to develop a plan within 180 days to restructure the
exploration program and included a government-owned crew
and heavy-lift transportation system.13 4 It also required the re-
structured program: (1) to significantly use the work completed
for Orion and Ares I; (2) to be operational no later than Decem-
ber 31, 2015; (3) to have predicted safety levels equivalent to
Ares I and Orion; and (4) to have the capability of conducting
missions to several destinations beyond low-Earth orbit. 35
Moreover, section 202 required NASA to implement the new
128 H.R. 5781, 111th Cong. (2010). Representative Ralph Hall is now the com-
mittee chair.




133 Id. § 201; see also 2008 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-422,
§§ 401, 402, 122 Stat. 4779, 4788-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17731),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-314, § 6, 124 Stat. 3444 (Dec. 18, 2010).
134 H.R. 5781, § 202.
135 Id.
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program in a manner that utilized shuttle program personnel
and included innovative management practices to maintain real-
istic cost and schedule estimates. 13 6 Lastly, section 202 included
provisions for modernizing infrastructure at the Kennedy Space
Center and for international collaboration.
1 3 7
Although the bill directly conflicted with several proposals in
the budget request, there were areas where the two aligned.
One was in extending the operational life of the ISS. 138 Another
area of alignment was in using commercial. providers to supply
human transportation services to the ISS. 13' The bill included
provisions for human-rating commercially-developed vehicles,
the transfer of NASA-developed technology to commercial prov-
iders, and the establishment of a program to provide direct
loans or loan guarantees to commercial providers interested in
human transportation to space.140
The House bill differed significantly from the ultimately en-
acted Senate version in that it did not require NASA to develop
vehicles that met specific performance requirements.141 The ar-
chitects of the House bill were also wary of getting Congress into
the business of designing rockets by requiring that the vehicle
meet the specified requirements. 142 Thus, the House bill al-
lowed NASA to proceed with Ares 1's development in the event
the agency determined that it was superior to the proposed
alternatives. 143
2. The Senate Moves First and Writes the 2010 NASA
Authorization Act
Congress ultimately passed, and President Obama signed, the
bill that originated in the Senate. 144 Section 201 begins with a
broad statement outlining the U.S.'s human spaceflight policy
and specifies that "reliance upon and use of non-United States
human space flight capabilities shall be undertaken only as a
contingency in circumstances where no United States-owned
and operated human spaceflight capability is available, opera-
136 Id.
117 Id.
138 Id. § 211.
139 Id. § 242.
140 Id. § 243.
141 Interview with Ken Monroe, supra note 103.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See Press Release, White House, supra note 1.
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tional, and certified for flight by appropriate Federal agen-
cies."' 45 The bill also requires the NASA Administrator to
"proceed with the development of follow-on transportation sys-
tems in a manner that ensures that the national capability to
restart and fly Space Shuttle missions can be initiated" by an act
of Congress or a presidential determination transmitted to Con-
gress before the completion of the last space shuttle mission. 146
The bill then requires the Administrator to refurbish an existing
space shuttle external tank, known as ET-94, and to take all ac-
tions necessary to prepare the tank for use in the development
of the Space Launch System, "while preserving the ability to use
this tank if needed for an ISS contingency.
147
Additionally, the bill directs NASA to begin developing a gov-
ernment-owned system for human access to space. The first is a
heavy-lift launch vehicle identified in the bill as the Space
Launch System (SLS)148 In developing the SLS, the NASA Ad-
ministrator must "to the extent practicable, extend or modify
existing vehicle development and associated contracts" includ-
ing contracts relating to solid rocket motors "to ensure their
availability for development of the Space Launch System.
149
Furthermore, the vehicle must meet certain minimum require-
ments including: (1) an initial capability to lift payloads between
seventy and one hundred tons to low-Earth orbit; (2) the capa-
bility to carry an integrated Earth departure stage that will bring
the total lift capability to at least one hundred and thirty tons;
(3) the capability to lift the multipurpose crew vehicle; and (4)
the ability to serve as a backup for ISS crew or cargo require-
ments.1 50 The Administrator must also "ensure critical skills and
capabilities are retained, modified, and developed, as appropri-
ate, in areas related to solid and liquid engines, large diameter
fuel tanks, rocket propulsion, and other ground test capabilities
for an effective transition to the follow-on Space Launch Sys-
tem." ' And the bill specifies that "[p]riority should be placed
145 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 201, 124 Stat. 2805,
2811 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18311).
146 Id. § 203(b) (1).
147 Id. § 203(b) (2).
148 Id. § 302.
149 Id. § 302(b).
150 Id. § 302(c) (1).
151 Id. § 302(c) (3).
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on the core elements with the goal for operational capability"
no later than December 31, 2016.152
The second vehicle that the bill requires NASA to develop is
outlined in section 303 and is designated as the Multi-Purpose
Crew Vehicle (MPCV).153 The vehicle should "advance develop-
ment of the human safety features, designs, and systems in the
Orion project. ' 154 The section begins with the goal that the
MPCV "achieve full operational capability" no later than Decem-
ber 31, 2016, and permits the Administrator to test the vehicle at
the ISS before that date.1 55 The vehicle must also meet several
specified minimum-capability requirements including: (1)
"[t]he capability to serve as the primary crew vehicle for mis-
sions beyond low-Earth orbit;" (2) the capability to perform sev-
eral in-space operations "such as rendezvous, docking, and
extra-vehicular activities;" (3) the capability to deliver crew and
cargo to the ISS in the event commercial providers are unable to
perform those tasks; and (4) the ability to incorporate new tech-
nologies in an efficient and timely manner.1 5 6
The bill also requires NASA to use existing workforce and
technologies in developing the SLS and the MPCV. 157 Section
304 requires the Administrator to use, "to the extent practica-
ble," the "existing contracts, investments, workforce, industrial
base, and capabilities from the Space Shuttle and Orion and
Ares I projects" including "[s]pace [s]huttle-derived compo-
nents and Ares I components that use existing United States
propulsion systems, including liquid fuel engines, external tank
or tank-related capability, and solid rocket motor engines." 58
Congress passed the 2010 NASA Authorization Act on Sep-
tember 29, 2010, and President Obama subsequently signed the
bill into law on October 11, 2010.'
152 Id. § 302(c)(2).
153 See id. § 303.
154 Id. § 303(a)(1).
155 Id. § 303 (a) (2).
156 Id. § 303(b).
157 Id. § 304.
158 Id.
159 Press Release, NASA, Statement by NASA Administrator Charles F. Bolden
Thanking Congress for 2010 Authorization Act Support, Sept. 29, 2010, available
at http://www.nasa.gov/news/speeches/admin/BoldenNASAAuthorization_
Support.html; Press Release, White House, supra note 1.
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C. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
2010 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT
Although the 2010 Act was a significant step forward in guid-
ing NASA's human spaceflight plans, the restrictions in NASA's
fiscal year 2010 appropriations and in the supplemental appro-
priations act prevent NASA from cancelling Constellation-re-
lated programs."' An analysis conducted by the NASA
Inspector General found that the restriction forced NASA to
spend up to $215 million on Constellation Projects through Feb-
ruary 2011 that NASA otherwise "would have considered cancel-
ing or significantly scaling back" without the restriction.161
The 2010 Act also required NASA to submit a report not later
than ninety days after enactment regarding NASA's plans for de-
veloping the SLS and the MPCV. 16 2 The bill required that the
report include "an overall description of the reference vehicle
design, the assumptions, description, data and analysis of the
systems trades and resolution process," and other technical cri-
teria NASA used in selecting the design. 163 NASA released a
preliminary report on January 11, 2011, which concluded NASA
"could build a heavy-lift rocket incorporating the space shuttle's
main engines, giant external tank and taller versions of the shut-
tle's solid-rocket boosters-but not within Congress' budget and
timetable."' 64 Senators Bill Nelson and Kay Bailey Hutchison re-
sponded to the report in a letter to NASA Administrator Charles
Bolden. 165 The letter noted that the vehicles the report pro-
posed appeared to meet the requirements of the 2010 Act but
160 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I 1-216T, NASA: ISSUES IMPLE-
MENTING THE NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2010 2-3 (2010).
161 Letter from Paul K Martin, Inspector Gen., NASA, to Sen. John D. Rocke-
feller, Chairman, and Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Ranking Member, Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., U.S. Senate (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://
oig.nasa.gov/readingRoom/Rock.pdf.
162 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 309, 124 Stat. 2805,
2819 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18327).
163 Id.
164 NASA and Congress Spar over Heavy-Lift Rocket, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41065824/ns/technologyand science/from/
toolbar; see also NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., PRELIMINARY REPORT RE-
GARDING NASA's SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM AND MULTI-PURPOSE CREW VEHICLE
(2011) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
510449mainSLSMPCV_90-dayReport.pdf.
165 Letter from Sen. Bill Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. on Sci. & Space, and
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Ranking Member, Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., U.S. Senate, to Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Adm'r, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space
Admin. (Jan. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Charles F. Bolden, Jr.], available at
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pointed out that the report did not contain any "specific justifi-
cation or analyses to validate" NASA's claims about the vehicles'
unaffordability. 16
D. THE SAUSAGE MAKING IS OVER, OR Is IT?
Although the President's original budget proposal was a sig-
nificant departure from the direction NASA had been moving,
the 2010 Act seems to be a compromise that preserves Constella-
tion's central elements while respecting the President's preroga-
tive to have a space program that reflects administration
priorities. Part IV of this Comment, however, shows that signifi-
cant disputes may develop as NASA begins to implement the
2010 Act and as Congress responds to NASA's implementations.
A harbinger of the potential disputes appears in the letter from
Senators Nelson and Hutchison to NASA Administrator
Bolden.167 As a senior staff member of the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee said, "the law is what
everybody agrees it is.' 168 Unfortunately, it appears likely that
NASA and Congress do not agree on substantial portions of the
2010 Act.
IV. HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM: AMERICAN
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT IN JEOPARDY
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act represents a compromise
between President Obama's proposal, congressional demands,
and NASA's previous plans.'69 As NASA implements the 2010
Act, several ambiguous provisions will likely cause additional tur-
bulence. The provisions' multiple interpretations and NASA's
stakeholders' expectations have already begun, and likely will




167 See supra Part III.C.
168 Interview with Jeff Bingham, Senior Adviser on Space and Aeronautics,
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp. (Republican Staff), U.S. Senate, in
Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15, 2010).
169 See Press Release, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Senate, Chair-
man Rockefeller's Remarks on Transition and Implementation: The NASA Au-
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ing the vehicles called for in the 2010 Act.170 These challenges,
combined with uncertain economic conditions, could lead to
paralysis for the space agency and result in stalling the new vehi-
cles' development. Ultimately, these conditions may leave the
United States without independent access to space for the fore-
seeable future.
A. INTERPRETATION PROBLEMS IN THE 2010 ACT
As noted, the 2010 Act cancels the Constellation vehicles in
development and mandates that NASA develop a new heavy-
launch vehicle and a crew vehicle with specific performance re-
quirements. 7 Additionally, the 2010 Act strongly suggests, and
possibly requires, that NASA use existing contracts and technol-
ogies in the new vehicle designs. 7 2 As NASA begins developing
the new vehicles, disagreements in interpreting the human
spaceflight provisions will likely develop between NASA and
Congress, especially regarding those provisions concerning the
SLS and the MPCV.173 The first signs of disagreement began in
January 2011 after NASA sent a preliminary report regarding
the reference designs for the SLS and the MPCV. 174
As NASA begins to implement the 2010 Act, it must read the
Act in concert with other applicable laws, including the continu-
ing resolution that prohibits NASA from cancelling Constella-
tion-related activities. 175 So, "NASA must carry out the recently
enacted Authorization Act but without terminating or creating
programs, projects, or activities of the Constellation
[P] rogram. '1 76
1. Deciphering "to the Maximum Extent Practicable"
Because the 2010 Act specifies that NASA should use existing
contracts and technologies "to the extent practicable" in devel-
oping the SLS and the MPCV, there is a strong possibility of
substantial disagreement over what NASA must do to comply
170 Robert Block & Mark K. Matthews, NASA Flails as Forces Pull on It from All
Sides, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2011, at Al, available at 2011 WLNR 996757.
171 See 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, §§ 201-304, 124
Stat. 2805, 2811-16 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18311-24).
172 Id. § 304(a).
173 See supra Part III.B.2.
174 See Block & Matthews, supra note 170; see also supra Part III.C.
175 U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-216T, supra note 160.
176 Id.
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with those provisions.177 A staff member on NASA's oversight
committee in the Senate who helped craft the 2010 Act inter-
prets the phrase as directing NASA to implement the Act as
specified unless there is a very good reason to go in a different
direction.1 78 Meanwhile, a staff member on NASA's oversight
committee in the House of Representatives said "extent practica-
ble" means "this is what we want you to do-period, unless there
is a really, really good reason that you can show us why you can't
do it that way."'1 79 Former NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin,
interprets the phrase as binding if the specified requirements
would reasonably work. 8 1 In other words, if NASA wanted to
use something not specified, any alternative must meet the tech-
nical requirements and should not be substantially more expen-
sive or take substantially longer. 8 1 An associate general counsel
at NASA interprets the phrase to mean that NASA must first and
foremost comply with all applicable legal requirements, includ-
ing those relating to competition. 8 2 And NASA CFO Elizabeth
Robinson explained that the language gives a lot of discretion to
the NASA Administrator about what he deems practicable, but
emphasized that the language does not repeal the laws associ-
ated with awarding and administering contracts in the
government. 8 '
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal agencies have
substantial discretion in interpreting statutes, especially when
the subject matter is "technical and complex." '84 But, "the
phrase 'to the maximum extent practicable' does not permit an
agency unbridled discretion. It imposes a clear duty on the
agency to fulfill the statutory command to the extent that it is
feasible or possible."' 85 Additionally, the "extent practicable"
177 See 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 304, 124 Stat.
2805, 2816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18324).
178 Interview with Jeff Bingham, supra note 168.
179 Interview with Ken Monroe, supra note 103.
180 Telephone Interview with Michael D. Griffin, former Adm'r, Nat'l Aeronau-
tics & Space Admin. (Dec. 14, 2010).
181 Id.
182 Interview with R. Andrew Falcon, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Aeronautics &
Space Admin., in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15, 2010).
183 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Robinson, supra note 20.
184 Aluminum Co. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390
(1984).
185 Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 107 (D.D.C. 1995), amended,
967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir.
1993)); see also SMS Data Prods. Grp. v. United States, 853 F.2d 1547, 1553 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 191 (3d Cir. 1983)).
620
2010 NASA A UTHORIZA TION A CT
language effectively places dual requirements on NASA in devel-
oping the new vehicles because it applies to existing contracts
and existing technology.'86 The first requirement relates to the
legal question of whether NASA must re-compete the Constella-
tion contracts, while the second relates to what technologies
NASA should use in the SLS and MPCV. 87
In determining whether NASA must re-compete a contract,
the agency generally examines each existing contract's state-
ment of work and then determines whether the work needed for
the new vehicle is within the scope of the original contract.'
Without discussing each relevant factor, the basic standard when
making the determination is: would the competitors or any
other entities that might have competed in the original competi-
tion expect that the work now needed would have been part of
the original competition?'8 9 Alternatively, was there something
in the original solicitation where one could foresee that the
work described would have grown into the current program or
project?90
2. The Ninety-Day Report
In January 2011, NASA issued the ninety-day report.19' The
report was preliminary in nature, but NASA stated that it hoped
to issue a complete report sometime as early as spring 2011 after
completing additional analysis and accounting for any subse-
quent appropriations acts and the President's fiscal year 2012
budget request. 19 2 In the report, NASA asserted that it has been
unable "to identify heavy-lift and capsule architectures that
would both meet all SLS requirements and these goals."19
Moreover, "none of the design options studied thus far ap-
peared to be affordable in our present fiscal conditions, based
upon existing cost models, historical data, and traditional acqui-
sition approaches."'9 4 Although NASA settled on a "Reference
186 See 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, §§ 302-04, 124 Stat.
2805, 2814-17 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18322-24).
187 See id.
18 Interview with R. Andrew Falcon, supra note 182.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 1; see 2010 NASA Authorization Act
§ 309.
192 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 3.
193 See id. (referring to requirements from the NASA Administrator that the
systems are "affordable, sustainable, and realistic").
194 Id. at 4.
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Vehicle Design" for both the SLS and the MPCV, the agency was
emphatic that neither design "currently fits the projected
budget profiles nor the schedule goals outlined in the Authori-
zation Act."' 9 5 NASA is also studying "other options to solicit
innovative ideas and ensure the best value for the American
taxpayers."' 96
a. The Space Launch System
The SLS, outlined in section 302, must be able to: (1) lift be-
tween seventy and one hundred tons to low-Earth orbit; (2) in-
crease that capability to eventually one hundred and thirty tons;
(3) lift the MPCV; and (4) serve as a backup system for supply-
ing crew and cargo services to the ISS.197 The 2010 Act also re-
quires that NASA, to the "extent practicable," extend or modify
existing contracts, "including contracts for ground testing of
solid rocket motors, if necessary." 98 Finally, the 2010 Act sets a
"goal for operational capability for the core elements not later
than December 31, 2016." 199
In the ninety-day report, NASA proposed the Reference Vehi-
cle Design for the SLS, consisting of a central core derived from
the space shuttle's external tank and powered by five liquid oxy-
gen/liquid hydrogen engines derived from the space shuttle
main engines. 2 0 The central core will be mated with two five-
segment solid rocket boosters originally intended for Ares I and
Ares V 20 1 Finally, an upper stage powered by the J2-X-an en-
gine NASA was developing for the Ares I upper stage and the
Ares VEarth-departure stage-would sit above the vehicle's cen-
tral core.20 z NASA estimates that this vehicle will "provide an
ultimate lift capability of approximately 130 metric tons to [low-
Earth orbit] ."2°3 NASA further advised that it was evaluating ex-
isting shuttle and Ares contracts "to determine whether those
contracts could be used for development work on the SLS and
195 Id. at 6.
196 Id. at 4.
197 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 302(c), 124 Stat.
2805, 2815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18322(c)).
1g Id. § 302(b) (2).
199 Id. § 302(c) (2).
200 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 10.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. LEO is an acronym for low-Earth orbit.
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whether doing so would be the most affordable and efficient
option for developing the SLS. 204
Although the 2010 Act does not specify exactly what the vehi-
cle should look like, Congress is likely expecting an "in-line"
vehicle composed of two solid rocket boosters, an external tank,
space shuttle main engines, and the MPCV mounted above the
external tank.20 5 In other words, the 2010 Act envisions a vehi-
cle very similar, if not identical, to the Reference Vehicle De-
sign. Additionally, Senators Nelson and Hutchison confirmed
that the Reference Vehicle Design appears to comply with the
2010 Act's requirements. 2 6
b. Orion Reincarnated as the MPCV
Section 303(b) details the minimum capability requirements
for the MPCV.20 7 The MPCV "shall continue to advance devel-
opment of the human safety features, designs, and systems in
the Orion project. ' 20 8 Additionally, the MPCV must be able to:
(1) "serve as the primary crew vehicle for missions beyond low-
Earth orbit;" (2) conduct a wide variety of in-space operations
including "rendezvous, docking, and extra-vehicular activities;"
(3) serve as a back-up to commercial providers for crew and
cargo transfer to the ISS; and (4) evolve in a timely and efficient
manner.20 9 The 2010 Act sets the MPCV's operational capability
date as not later than December 31, 2016, and permits NASA to
test the vehicle at the ISS before that date.210
In the ninety-day report, NASA selected the Orion version ca-
pable of travel beyond low-Earth orbit (known as the beyond-
LEO version) as the Reference Vehicle Design for the MPCV.211
NASA found that this Orion version met "the minimum capabili-
ties required by the Authorization Act. ' 212 This version of Orion
meets the 2010 Act's requirements for operations beyond low-
Earth orbit and has the capability to serve as a backup for servic-
ing the ISS; however, NASA noted that using this Orion version
204 Id. at 13.
205 S. REP. No. 111-278, at 9 (2010); Interview with Jeff Bingham, supra note
168; Interview with Ken Monroe, supra note 103.
206 Letter to Charles F. Bolden, Jr., supra note 165, at 1.
207 2010 NASA Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-267, § 303(b), 124 Stat.
2805, 2816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18323(b)).
208 Id. § 303(a) (1).
209 Id. § 303(b) (1)-(4).
210 Id. § 303(a) (2).
211 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 17.
212 Id. at 18.
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for servicing the ISS "will represent a highly inefficient vehicle
usage. '215 NASA indicated that it was not yet clear whether the
MPCV Reference Vehicle Design met the principles that any
new systems be "affordable, sustainable, and realistic" and
warned that if NASA finds this design cannot meet those princi-
ples, "then NASA will explore other options, including changes
to the Reference Vehicle Design. '214 Finally, NASA noted that
the December 2016 goal does not appear achievable with cur-
rent and projected funding levels.21 5
3. The Tension Begins
Several members of Congress were not pleased with NASA's
report.21 6 The chairmen and ranking members of NASA's Sen-
ate oversight committee and subcommittee stated that they ap-
preciated the report and "look[ed] forward to the additional
material that was required but not submitted. 2 1 7 The senators
were especially unhappy with the agency's inability to find af-
fordable designs: "NASA must use its decades of space know-how
and billions of dollars in previous investments to come up with a
concept that works. '2 1 8 NASA's House oversight committee
chairman was more critical, stating that the report "is only the
beginning of a long conversation Congress will have with the
agency regarding the future of the human space flight program.
It was this Administration that killed the Constellation program,
which Congress had repeatedly endorsed."21
9
Senators Bill Nelson and Kay Bailey Hutchison wrote a letter
to NASA Administrator Charles Bolden expressing their con-
cerns and conveying their expectations for NASA.22° The letter
first acknowledged that the proposed designs appear to comply
with the 2010 Act but pointed out that the report's affordability
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 21.
216 Press Release, Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., U.S. House of Representa-
fives, Chairman Hall Assures Close Oversight of NASA Human Space Flight Pro-
gram (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://science.house.gov/PressRoom/
Item.aspx?ID=28; Press Release, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Sen-
ate, supra note 105.
217 Press Release, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Senate, supra
note 105.
218 Id.
219 Press Release, Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., U.S. House of Representa-
tives, supra note 216.
220 See generally Letter to Charles F. Bolden, Jr., supra note 165.
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concerns "do[ ] not include the required detail regarding pro-
curement and management innovations that the law intended
to be a part of the new vehicles' development. '22' The letter
continued that affordability concerns could be expected if the
2010 Act directed NASA to begin a new development without
using "existing contracts, technologies, and infrastructure," but
that the agency's response suggested "a misunderstanding of the
Congressional intent. '222 Moreover, "[p] revious studies by both
NASA and industry have indicated that... NASA can reach ini-
tial operating capability of a scalable heavy-lift launch vehicle
with the funds authorized." 221
The letter also cited a GAO opinion that concluded, "'where
Congress directs that a [contracting] preference be given to the
greatest extent practicable, an agency must either provide the
preference or articulate a reasoned explanation of why it is im-
practicable to do so.' "224 The letter concluded with the admoni-
tion that the 2010 Act "is not an optional, advisory document: it
is the law. 225
NASA now must determine whether to modify its existing con-
tracts with the Ares I and Orion contractors or begin a new com-
petition.2 26 In the ninety-day report, NASA indicated that it was
evaluating its existing contracts for their applicability to the new
vehicles, including the Orion contract with Lockheed Martin.227
Aerojet, a builder of solid and liquid propelled engines, in-
formed NASA that it "'intend[s] to compete" for the engines
on the new rocket.228 Additionally, "key aerospace companies
have demanded that NASA open the new rocket project to com-
petition or face the prospect of lawsuits. '229 Several contracting
attorneys have stated that the SLS "is a significant-enough
change in the scope of the project as to require NASA to rebid
the contracts or face potentially lengthy legal action. ' 2 0 Al-
though NASA is still evaluating its existing contracts, the Orion-
related contracts are likely better candidates for contract exten-
221 Id. at 1.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 2.
224 Id. at 3 (citing Ocuto Blacktop & Paving Co., B-284165, 2000 WL 235642, at
*5 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 1, 2000)).
225 Id.
226 Block & Matthews, supra note 170.
227 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 13, 20.
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sion than the Ares-related contracts because the MPCV's re-
quirements are more directly traceable to the original Orion
than the SLS requirements are to the Ares vehicles. 23 1 Even
before NASA selected Orion as the Reference Vehicle Design, an
associate general counsel for NASA indicated that he could see
NASA coming to two different conclusions regarding contract
extensions for the two vehicles. 2 2 Senate staff members who
helped write the 2010 Act indicated "that NASA has no choice
but to extend the contracts. '233 The letter from Senators Nelson
and Hutchison reinforced this expectation and emphasized that
the 2010 Act's "directed actions to be performed by NASA 'to
the maximum extent practicable' or 'to the extent practicable,'
such as the requirement ... to extend or modify existing con-
tracts, should be carried out, unless the agency can demonstrate
why they are infeasible or impossible to perform. 23 4
4. A Vicious Cycle?
Some congressional members have expressed concern that
NASA does not intend to comply with the 2010 Act's direction
and would rather proceed in a different manner.23 5 In a Decem-
ber hearing of NASA's Senate oversight committee, Senator Bill
Nelson declared that "'[t]here have been plenty of messages
that have been sent to the overseers, which is this committee,
that certain elements of NASA and other parts of the adminis-
tration intend to follow their own directions instead of the
law.' ,,236 President Obama's Science Advisor, John P. Holdren,
assured the committee that NASA "[a]bsolutely" intends to fol-
low the law in the 2010 Act, a sentiment shared by NASA Chief
Financial Officer Elizabeth Robinson, who also testified at the
hearing.237
In February 2011, the Obama administration released the fis-
cal year 2012 budget request for NASA that continues total
231 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 164, at 17. "NASA has performed initial
assessments of the current Orion Project's applicability to the new MPCV require-
ments in the Authorization Act, and has adopted the beyond-LEO Orion design
as the Reference Vehicle Design for MPCV." Id.
232 Interview with R. Andrew Falcon, supra note 182.
233 Block & Matthews, supra note 170.
234 Letter to Charles F. Bolden, Jr., supra note 165, at 3.
235 See Kenneth Chang, Senators Push NASA to Cany out Revamping, N.Y. TIMES
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NASA spending at $18.7 billion.23 1 The proposal "immediately
reignited a heated battle with Congress over the role" of com-
mercial providers. 239 The budget allocated $350 million more
for commercial providers than authorized in the 2010 Act.
240
The SLS and MPCV funding total was $1.2 billion less than the
2010 Act authorized-"to free up money for new-technology re-
search. '24 1 Senator Bill Nelson released a statement that said
the budget "'does not follow the bipartisan NASA law Congress
passed late last year.' "242 And House Appropriations Committee
member John Culberson stated that President Obama "may of-
fer a budget of things he wishes to do, but he's bound to follow
the law," and added that he was disappointed to see a return to a
policy "'overwhelmingly rejected by the public and Con-
gress.' If Congress decides that NASA is moving in a direc-
tion inconsistent with congressional intent in executing the
2010 Act, then Congress could pass a "technical corrections bill"
to fine tune and remove any unintended consequences that
arise from the 2010 Act's implementation.24 4
B. RISKS TO AMERICA'S HuMAN SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM
In addition to the difficulties ahead in implementing the 2010
Act, there are several additional challenges facing America's
human spaceflight program. The first challenge is whether
NASA can accomplish the tasks before it in an era of economic
uncertainty. Secondly, now that the precedent has been set that
a new administration can redirect a developing human spacef-
light program that receives broad congressional support, sup-
port from Congress may erode as members tire of supporting
each administration's plans for human spaceflight. This erosion
could eventually leave the United States without human access
to space.
With the current economic conditions, there are several un-
certainties regarding the agency's funding; however, one thing
is clear: huge budget increases are likely out of the question.
House appropriators are working to reduce most domestic fed-
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eral agency budgets to fiscal year 2008 levels. 245 Additionally,
President Obama's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request proposed
continuing NASA's enacted 2010 budget of $18.7 billion and
notionally projected the next five years to remain at that
amount.24 6 This amount represents more than NASA's 2008
budget of $17.3 billion but is $300 million less than the pro-
jected $19.0 billion for fiscal year 2012 that NASA projected in
its fiscal year 2011 budget.24 7 But, "appropriators are looking to
protect the budgets for agencies such as NASA." 248
The significant possibility of stagnant or lower budgets for the
next few years, combined with NASA's acknowledgement that
the new vehicles likely will not be available for flight before De-
cember 2016, likely means that the United States will not have a
government-owned capability for human access to space
through at least the end of President Obama's second term (as-
suming President Obama runs and is re-elected for a second
term). Without a vehicle in operation, there is likely nothing to
prevent a new administration from again cancelling NASA's
human spaceflight plans and replacing them with its own. At
that point, there is the risk that members of Congress will tire of
spending billions on a new proposal with each new president
and will simply decline to fund the new plans.249 Dr. Scott Pace,
Director of George Washington University's Space Policy Insti-
tute, agreed by saying, "If this were to occur, I would see a de-
cline and loss of U.S. leadership. '250 He also sees an ever more
dire situation "of the United States being out of the human
spaceflight business" if the ISS fails before a commercial or gov-
ernment system becomes available because there will not be a
245 Andrew Taylor, Conservatives Want to Deepen Budget Cuts Vowed on Stump, As-
SOCLATED PREss, Jan. 21, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1324423.
246 Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb.
2011), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/516684mainFY12-summaryBudgetBriefing-
final_21411_revl.pdf.
247 Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Estimates, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb.
2008), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/210019mainNASAFY09-Budget.Estimates.
pdf; Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb.
2010), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420990mainFY-201-%20BudgetOverview 1
Feb_2010.pdf.
248 Taylor, supra note 245.
249 Interview with Ken Monroe, supra note 103. Mr. Monroe indicated that it
was difficult to quantify the risk, but stated that there are space supporters in
Congress who are concerned with such a scenario.
250 Interview with Scott Pace, Dir., Space Policy Inst., Elliott Sch. of Int'l Affairs,
George Wash. Univ., in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 14, 2010).
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commercially justifiable human flight destination in low-Earth
orbit.25 1
Dr. Pace suggested that a possible solution to discourage each
administration from making drastic changes to the human
spaceflight program would be to -model the science commu-
nity.25 2 The science community decides which missions to un-
dertake by first asking several broad questions, placing them in
order of scientific priority, and gradually answering those ques-
tions through successive missions.253 While the questions and
missions change over time, the science community does not see
drastic changes to its programs with each successive administra-
tion.254 In Dr. Pace's view, science questions change, but the
changes are independent of political cycles. 255 The idea has
gained traction-as it was included in the 2010 Act.256 Section
204 directs the NASA Administrator to "contract with the Na-
tional Academies for a review of the goals, core capabilities, and
direction of human space flight, using the goals" from the Space
Act, the 2005, 2008, and 2010 NASA Authorization Acts, and any
presidentially-issued space policy statement.257 If the human
spaceflight community implements and institutionalizes this re-
port as the science community has done, then some political
risk may be mitigated.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act is not an ideal solution to
the numerous problems facing the nation's human spaceflight
program. But the restrictions placed on NASA and the difficul-
ties in interpreting the 2010 Act are a small price to pay when
compared to the alternative of not having a U.S. government
capability for human spaceflight. The human spaceflight pro-
gram is a national treasure, and all stakeholders must innovate
and act prudently to preserve it during this period of instability.
NASA has significant obstacles in its path. Congress has indi-
cated that it will closely monitor NASA's progress in implement-
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interests as it begins to design the new vehicles. It will not be
easy, but NASA has achieved brilliant successes when tested in
the past. One thing, however, is certain: NASA must implement
the 2010 Act in a manner that maximizes each dollar that Con-
gress allocates.
The nation's political leaders must not forget the recommen-
dations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and the
Augustine Commission. The nation must have a mandate for
human space exploration and be willing to fund NASA in a
manner that allows it to achieve that mandate. Perhaps the best
way to achieve that is to move away from having presidents set
the goals for the space program and implement the science
community's method.
Regardless of the path forward, the nation would be wise to
remember that "[t]here never has been a great civilization that
did not occupy the frontier of its time. Space is the frontier of
our time, and the United States will not remain a great nation if
we are not in the lead in occupying, extending, exploring, [and]
exploiting that frontier. '258 The United States cannot simply
stop exploring space until the day when Chinese astronauts pre-
sent a future president with the American flag that was left on
the moon in 1969.259
258 Telephone Interview with Michael D. Griffin, supra note 180.
259 This scenario was relayed to the author during an interview.
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